When optimizing an aggregate of several individual objective functions, it may be possible to decompose the set of individual objectives into groups across which there are no conflicting in- 
Introduction
Consider a situation in which an action, or program, must be chosen, and suppose that each of the available alternative programs has several real components.
In other words, each alternative program is a list of, say, m real numbers. In attempting to choose the best program, suppose that our goal is to maximize the total utility (for example, the total profit, revenue, sales, etc.) of a group of individual units, or agents, where the utility of each one of the agents is affected by the program that we choose. Suppose further that each agent's utility is unaffected by changing the program in certain ways -each agent has a certain indifference about alternative programs. The question that I wish to explore in this paper is whether there is a useful relation between the structure of these 'indifferences' -i.e. the structure of the decision problem -on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the effects that a change in one agent's utility function will have upon the other agents' utility levels. In other words, can the structure of a collective decision problem, or an aggregate optimization problem, have useful implications for the inter-agent sensitivity analysis, or the comparative statics, of the problem?
Even at this early stage, it will be helpful to have a bit of notation.
Let us represent programs by vectors XE IRm ; let us index the agents by the elements of the set N={l,2,..., n}; and let us characterize each agent ie N by his utility function ui : lRm -+ R, which describes how his utility depends upon the program that is chosen.
We are interested in the way that the optimal program depends upon the individuals' utility functions.
We will assume throughout that the utility functions are sufficiently well-behaved that for any profile u = (ul, . . . , u,) of utility functions there is a unique optimal program and that the optimal program varies smoothly with changes in the functions ui. Let us denote this smooth function from profiles to programs by 7~ : u u x. At this level of generality the analysis of the differential properties of the function 7~ is well understood: it is a straightforward application of the Implicit Function Theorem. In many applications it is important to take account of certain additional structure that the problem exhibits. In particular, we often know that each agent's utility does not depend upon all m components of a program, but only on a (fixed) subset of components.
More generally, an agent's utility may depends only upon a set of 'generalized' components -i.e. each agent i E N may be characterized by a subspace 4 of Rm, in the sense that his utility level ui(x) will be unaffected by varying the program x if the variation lies in the subspace 4. We refer to 4 as i's 'indifference space' and to its orthogonal complement (denoted AJ as his 'affective space'. A classical example of the situation we have described so far is an 'exchange economy', in which there are k 'commoditites ' and each agent cares only about how much of each commodity is allocated to him. A program is an nk-tuple (i.e. m = nk), and we can order the components in such a way that agent 1 cares about the first k (i.e. A, is the subspace spanned by'the first k unit vectors), agent 2 cares about the next k, and so on. Notice that in this example the economy is 'decomposable' in the sense that lR* is the direct sum of the spaces Ai -i.e. every vector in Rm can be expressed in a unique way as a sum Cx;, where each xi EAT.
A second example is a variation of the first one: suppose that the total amount of each commodity k that will be allocated to the n agents is a fixed number of units. Now the set of possible (or feasible) allocations is an (n -l)k-dimensional affine subspace of Pk, or more conveniently, simply Rm, where m = (n -1)k. Now if we consider each individual's utility for feasible allocations, it is no longer possible, as it was in the first example, to decompose the economy into disjoint sets Np of agents and 'corresponding' subspaces ZP of the feasible space -i.e. subspaces ZP whose direct sum is Rm and that have the property that each Ai is a subspace of the space ZP for which i E NP. In this example, then, it seems as if we ought to say that the economy is 'indecomposable'.
The second example is of course the only one that is really interesting. In the first example the decompositon of the economy corresponds in an obvious way to a decomposition of the optimization problem: we can find the optimal program x by simply choosing, for each i, the Xi (or the appropriate projection of Xi) that maximizes Ui. In the second example, the optimization problem cannot be decomposed because it takes explicit account of the conflicting interests of the agents, and it is these conflicting interests that cannot be decomposed. It turns out that there is another way in which the two examples differ from one another. In the first example it is clear that if we change one of the functions ui (but change it in such a way that agent i still cares only about the quantities allocated to himself), then the resulting change in the optimal program x= n(u) will not affect any other agent's utility level. In the second example, on the other hand, the utility level of every agent can be affected (at least generically) by changing the slope of any other agent's utility function -every agent can affect every other agent in the second example. This property is an important one in general, not just in this example, and it seems to be related to the indecomposability of the optimization problem.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the relation between the two ideas of decomposition and 'affectability'. It will be shown that in fact the two ideas are equivalent: in an optimization problem of the kind we have outlined, a pair of agents cannot affect one another if and only if they can be separated -i.e. if and only if there is a decomposition of the problem which leaves the two agents in separate component parts of the decomposition. Thus, in particular, the second example is not misleading: in any indecomposable optimization problem (that is, in any problem in which the conflicting interests of the agents cannot be decomposed), all of the agents will be able to affect one another.
The theory that will be developed here has been applied elsewhere to an important problem in economic theory, namely the question of whether there are allocation mechanisms that (a) are immune to manipulation by the agents participating in them and (b) always achieve allocations that are Pareto optimal. Hurwicz and Walker (1988) have shown that an allocation mechanism cannot satisfy both (a) and (b) if all participants are able to affect one another in the sense outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The results in the present paper, then, support a much simpler characterization of the 'bad' economies in Hurwicz and Walker (1989) : if an economy is indecomposable -i.e. if the participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no conflicting interests -then the economy will not admit a 'successful' allocation mechanism (one that satisfies both (a) and (b)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 defines the structure of decision problems in terms of the agents' affective and indifference spaces, and defines the notion that one agent can affect another agent. Sections 2 and 3 define the notion of a decomposition of an affective-space structure and develop a useful characterization of decomposable structures. The main result -that the presence or absence of inter-agent effects can be characterized by the decomposability of the affective-space structure of the decision problem -is established in Section 4. A concluding section describes a potential application to the economic problem of externalities and decentralization.
The affective structure of a decision problem
Since all of our analysis will concern first-order properties of the function Z, the analysis will be conducted in terms of the Hessian matrices (matrices of second par-tial derivatives) of the functions ui. Consequently, nothing will be lost if we assume that the utility functions are all quadratic:
The first derivative (the gradient) at a vector x is therefore = Q'x+ bi, and the matrix of second partial derivatives at every x is just Q':
(Matrices will be indexed with superscripts in order to enable us to index their elements with subscripts.)
For each profile u = (ur, . . . , u,) we denote the aggregate objective function by ~1, and we write Q for the sum Cl Q': and the matrix of second partials of vu is simply Q. The main objects of study will be the affective spaces. We assume that an n-tuple We will assume throughout that the spaces Ai taken together span fRm. (There is no loss of generality here, for we could instead focus attention only on the subspace of lRm spanned by the sets Ai and redefine that subspace as IR".) Thus, the matrix Q will always be non-singular and there will be a unique program X= T(U) that maximizes v, U: it is the solution of the equation
We want to study the dependence of the solution x upon variations in the vectors bi, so we are interested in solutions of equations of the form:
The question we are interested in, as described in the Introduction, is whether, for a given pair of agents j and k, there is an admissible change in agent j's utility function for which the resulting change in x will affect k's utility. In other words, is there a vector dbj (which must be drawn from the space Aj) for which the solution Ax does not lie in Z,? The existence of such a vector is equivalent to the statement that Aj is not a subset of Q(Zk). We will say that j cannot affect k if AjS Q(Zk) for every profile Q = (Q', . . . , Q") of admissible matrices. If j can affect k -if there is a Q for which Aj9 Q(Z,) -then in fact every neighborhood in the space of admissible matrices will contain such a Q. Thus, the following definition is the one that we want to make. It will be shown in Section 4 that two agents can affect one another in a given structure if and only if they cannot be separated by a decomposition of the structure. Decomposition of structures will be defined and characterized in terms of matrices in Section 3, after we establish, in Section 2, how to characterize the admissible matrices in terms of alternative bases.
Changing the basis
In Section 1 the framework for our analysis was laid out entirely in terms of the usual basis for lRm.2 The analysis will depend heavily upon changes in the basis, however, and it will be important to have a notation that takes account of different bases. Let 8 denote the usual basis for lRm, consisting of the m unit vectors q,..., m. e Let $3 be an arbitrary basis for F, consisting of the m vectors pr, . . . , P m, and let C be the matrix whose rows are the members of 48, expressed in terms of 8. We will use the notation 2 and & to represent the conversion of a vector x and a matrix Q from &coordinates to B-coordinates, in the following sense (the notation Mt will always denote the transpose of the matrix M): We will also define a second coordinate tranformation in terms of the basis 48, using in this case the matrix C' (whose columns are the members of a):
i.e. x = Ct.?.
A few additional elementary properties of these coordinate changes are given in the following remarks. Indeed, Remarks 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 are the motivation for using these two particular transformations. however, that the relation between the sets A, and I, is the central feature of the theory, and that we therefore cannot ignore the basis that is being used.
matrix S (see Definition 1.2) for which Q = s. A profile (Q', . . . , Q") of matrices is admissible with respect to ~8 for the structure (AJ; -we also say the profile is (Ai)y,B-admissible -if each component Q' is Ai,%admissible for Aj.
Example. If the first k members of 48 constitute a basis for A, then the A,% admissible matrices are the ones for which the k x k principal submatrix at the upper' left is positive definite and for which all entries not in that submatrix are zero.
The following two lemmas give properties of A,SB-admissible matrices that we will need later in the paper. Lemma 2.1 simply assures us that (1.3) and (1.4) can be used to describe admissibility no matter what the basis. Proof. Let Q and Q' be A, S-admissible and let 1 be a positive real number. We must show that
In light of Lemma 2.1, (2.4) is obvious. For (2.3), we note first that x'(Q+ Q/)x= x'Qx+x'Q'x, which ensures that Q+ Q' is positive definite with respect to A. This also establishes that
It is easy to see that the column space of Q + Q' is a subspace of A (the column space of both Q and Q'), and this, together with (2.5), establishes that A is the column space of Q+ Q', Application of Lemma 2.1 yields (2.3). q
A useful alternative characterization of the set of admissible matrices for a basis 48 and a subspace A is as follows: a matrix is A, SSadmissible if and only if it can be expressed as the product M'M of a matrix M and its tranpose, where the rows of M constitute a basis for A (expressed in terms of the basis S for R"). This characterization and several of its useful properties are established in Appendix A.
Decomposability and block-diagonality
In this section we define and develop the concept of a decomposition of a structure (Ai);eN of affective spaces. As in the example in the Introduction, a decomposition of the structure (Ai)ieN is a separation of the aggregate optimization problem into two or more independent optimization problems, the individual solutions of which provide a solution of the aggregate problem.
Definition.
A decomposition of (Ai)ieN is a pair (P,(Z,),,,), where
A decomposition is non-trivial if the partition P is non-trivial (i.e. if P is not a singleton). We will write [ilp, or just [i] , for the equivalence class of i in P. Notice that when the sets Ai taken together span Rm, it follows a fortiori that the spaces ZP together span lRm. The two theorems to be given in this section will characterize decomposability in terms of the matrices Q= Cy Q' -specifically, (Ai)~ is shown to be decomposable if and only if there is a basis with respect to which every admissible matrix is blockdiagonal, with -blocks corresponding to the decomposing spaces Z,.
Theorem 3.1. Let ({N,, . . . , NK}, (Zk) 
We will show that each block B, is zero except when T=S = k. This will suffice, because Q = Cl Qi. We have Q'z E Ai for all z E IRm ; a fortiori, Q'z E 2, for all ZE lT?"l. In other words, if we write Q'z=y, and we partition the vector y into blocks, or 'segments', that correspond to the block-partitioning of & -i.e. y= (Y 1, . . . ,yK), where each segment Yj contains mj components -then according to Remark 2.4 we have ~j= 0 for j# k. Thus, according to Remark 2.3 (and because z was an arbitrary member of E?"), we have B,,= 0 if r#k (i.e. the only non-zero blocks are in the kth row of blocks). Because 8' is symmetric, we must in fact have, as desired, B,,= 0 unless T=S= k. Positive definiteness of all the diagonal blocks Bkk in & follows from the block-diagonality and positive definiteness of Q. 0
In Theorem 3.1 it was important to consider an ordering of the members of the basis for IRm, so that we could partition matrices into blocks that correspond to the decomposition of (A,);. This notion of an 'ordered' basis will continue to be important. Since the only sets to be endowed with an order will be finite sets, an ordered set will sometimes be more conveniently written as a c-tuple (no two of whose components are equal), where c is a positive integer. Intervals, or 'segments', of ordered sets will also be important:
Definition. A segment of a [-tuple (x1, . . . ,xg) is a k-tuple (x,+ l, . . . ,xr+& where r+lrl and r+k~r.
Thus, in the statement of Theorem 3.1, 48 is an ordered basis for IIF, consisting of K non-overlapping segments, in which (for each k) segment k is an ordered basis for Zk (the order within the segments was irrelevant to the statement and proof). Proof. Let (Q', . . . . Q") be an arbitrary (Ai):-admissible profile of matrices, and let i be an arbitrary agent in N. We will show that (1) @ has the block-diagonal form (3.1), and (2) all but one of the diagonal blocks in Qi are zero. Then we will use (1) and (2) to show that AiE zk for all i ENS. This will suffice, because then we simply define each set Nk as the set of agents i for whom the kth diagonal block is non-zero.
(1) According to the theorem's assumption, Q has the form (3.1). Suppose an off-diagonal block Br, of Qi is not zero. Then we can perturb the matrix Q' in an admissible way (e.g. multiply it by 1 + 6), with the result that Q (which is the sum of the Qi) will no longer have the form (3.1), because its corresponding offdiagonal block will no longer be zero.
(2) Suppose that two of the diagonal blocks of Q', say B,, and B, (r#s), are not zero. Then, according to Lemmas A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A, there is an Aiadmissible matrix in which the Br, block is not zero, contradicting what we have just established in (1).
NOW let JJ EAi; we must show that _Y E 2,. Since Ai is the column space of Q', there is a vector XE IRm for which Q'x=r -i.e. Q'z=p. But it is clear from the form that we have just established for Qi that if we partition 9 into segments with the same lengths as the segments C& of 3, then the only non-zero segment of 9 will be the kth one -in other words, according to Remark 2.4, YE&, as desired. 0
The results in this section can be summarized as follows: the structure (AJY of spaces is decomposable if and only if, in some basis, every admissible aggregate matrix Q= Cy Q' is block-diagonal.
Decomposability and affectability
The two theorems to be given in this section constitute the paper's main result, namely that two agents can affect one another in a given structure of spaces if and only if they cannot be separated -i.e. if and only if the structure cannot be decomposed in such a way that the two agents are in separate component parts of the decomposition. Proof. Let ({Nj,Nk}, (Zj,Z,) ) be a decomposition of (A,)7 in which jENj and k E Nk . Let ~j and .9$ be bases of Zj and Z,, and let 48 = sj U 9$, ordered SO that the members of aj come first. Then Theorem 3.1 guarentees that for every admissible profile (Q', . , . , Q") the matrix &= C: Qi will have the form:
If we partition vectors of IRm in the same way -i.e. y=(yj,yk) -then Y will be an element of Aj or Ak if and only if J$ = 0 or jj = 0, respectively. Let Y E Aj and let z= Q-iy; then we have:
Thus, according to Remark 2.4, ZEN, as desired. 0
The converse of Theorem 4.1 is Theorem 4.2, below, which is not nearly so easy to prove. The difficult part of the proof will be isolated as Lemma 4.2, below. The proofs of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 will both be deferred until after they have been used to prove Theorem 4.2 and until after some additional ideas have been developed that will help us to prove the two lemmas.
The first of the two lemmas tells us that if one agent can affect another, then adding an agent will not change that fact. The second lemma tells us that if two agents are separable, then adding an agent will not change that fact unless the addition allows one of the agents to affect the other. Without loss of generality, let j = 1 and k = 2. Lemma 4.1, applied recursively, ensures that A2 cannot affect A, in (Ai)~ for K= n -1, n -2, . . . ,3,2. In the case K= 2 it is easy to show that, as a consequence, Al and A, are separable in (Ai):. Now we can apply Lemma 4.2 recursively to establish that Al and A2 are separable in (Ai)f for K=3,...,n. 0
Now we must turn to proving Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. We first derive from the 'cannot affect' relation, A2SQ(Il), a rank condition on the matrix Q. which (discarding the 1 and -notations) is in turn equivalent to the statement that for every yC2) E iRm, there is a solution (z(,,,z(~)) of the following system:
It therefore follows that the dimension of the set of solutions to the system, (4.5)
is at least as large as the dimension of Al. Let mi, m2, and m3 denote the dimensions of Al, A2, and (A, + A*)' ; let o denote the dimension of the set of solutions to (4.5); and let Q denote the rank of the matrix B. Then cr + Q = m2 + m3. But we have just shown that arm2; thus, Q 5 m3. Moreover, Rank(B,,) I Q, by definition. But B,, is non-singular (because D is positive definite) -i.e. Rank(Bs3) = m3 -which yields the desired conclusion that Q = Rank(B33). 0 Now we are prepared to prove Lemma 4.1.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Assume that Al cannot affect A2 in (A,)?+'; we must show that A, also cannot affect A1 in (Ai)?. If A, fTA2 # {0}, then it is easy to show that A, can affect A2 in any structure (Ai) of spaces that includes them; we therefore have AlflAZ={O}.
Let (Q', . . . , Q") be an (Ai) -admissible profile of matrices; let Q = Cl Q'; and let Q' be an A,+r -admissible matrix. Because A, nAz = (0}, we can partition both & and Q' as in (4.1); let B,, and B:, denote the blocks of & and Q'.
We are going to consider matrices Q + ,@' for positive real numbers A. Because A, cannot affect A2 in (A,):+', we can apply Lemma 4.3 to these matrices. Specifically, we know that any column drawn from the left segment of B in (4.2) must be a linear combination of the columns in the right segment: let b and b' be (arbitrary) corresponding columns in the matrices then for every I > 0 there is a vector x E Rm that satisfies (4.6)
We must show that (4.6) is true for A = 0 as well. (Note that this is indeed sufficient, because B,, is non-singular, which implies that augmenting B33 with B13 does not increase its rank.)
Because B,, + AB& is non-singular, (4.6) is true (for each positive A) for the unique x(n) defined by
x(n) = (B33 + IB;,)-'(b + MI').
(4.7).
If we also define x(0) by equation (4.7) -i.e. x(0) = B,'b -then (4.6) holds true for A = 0: the limit (as A decreases to 0) of each term involving J. is equal to its value at J.=O. 0 For Lemma 4.2 we must partition matrices Q into blocks in the same way that we have already been doing in this section -namely, in a way that keeps agents 1 and 2 separate from the other agents -but we must also distinguish among those other agents: we must keep track of which of them are in the class [l] , which are in the class [21, and which are in neither class and therefore separable from 1 and 2. We will use the following notation and terminology:
If Ai and A2 are separable in (A,) ?, let (Nr,N,,Ns; (Z,,&, 5)) be a decomposition of (A,) ; in which Nr = [l] and N2 = [2] and in which Ni and N2 are minimal -that is, in which, for j = 1 and j = 2, i E Nj implies that i and j are not separableand in which the spaces Z, and Z, are also minimal, in the sense that for j = 1 and j = 2, Zj = C ie ljl Ai. Partition Nr and N2 as follows: Nr, = (1); N2, = (2); Nr" = [l] \ (1); N2" = [2] \ { 2). A well-ordered basis for II?"' is an ordered basis S (4.8) composed of the segments (in this order) at,, &, S?,", &., S13, where 8,, and a82' are ordered bases for A, and AZ; d,, U 9B,. and BY U .9iTze are ordered bases for Z, and Z, ; and sis, is an ordered basis for Zs . Let K= { l', 2: l", 2", 3}, and let K be endowed with the order 1'<2'< l"< 2"c3. For each keK, let mk be the number of members of Sk; and let J= (1, . . . ;m}, with SegmentS Jk of length mk. We Will partition matrices Q into blocks corresponding to the ordered set K: 
B31" B32" B33
1
The following lemma says that if Al and A2 are separable, then there is a wellordered basis in terms of which (a) changing any of the diagonal entries of an admissible matrix results in another admissible matrix, and (b) there is an admissible matrix in which every one of the 1 m-and 2"-columns has a non-zero entry above the diagonal. 
There is an (A,);, Sadmissible matrix Q in which, in every one of the l"-and 2"-columns, there is a non-zero entry above the diagonal -i.e. for every k E J,. U J2", there is a j c k such that Qjk > 0. (4.11)
Proof. We construct an appropriate basis 48 as follows. First, we construct a wellordered basis 88 that satisfies (4.10), and then we rearrange the order of 9B in such a way that (4.11) is satisfied, without disturbing the well-orderedness of 48. Begin with the set 48' = 0. We engage in an n-step process in which, at each step t, we consider, or 'take', an agent i(t) who has not been taken at any previous step, and we use that agent's space Ai to add some vectors to the ordered set 48'-', thereby obtaining an ordered set 48'. The order in which we take the agents is simply any order consistent with the ordered set K: for each k E K, we take the members of Nk in any order at all, but we consider the sets Nk in the order k= 1',2', 1",2", 3. At each step t, we add to .@-' any vectors from Ai that will turn &?-' into a basis 8' for the space xi=, A,(,) -i.e. we add any set of linearly independent vectors in Ai that are not expressible in terms of the vectors in .'B-'.
Let SS denote the ordered set obtained at the end of the last step of the construction described in the preceding paragraph -i.e. B is the ordered set @', endowed with the order in which its members were added. It is clear that .?B is a well-ordered basis. In order to show that it satisfies (4.10), let k be an arbitrary member of J, let t be the step at which the kth member of B (say, pk) was added, and let i be the agent i(t) from whose Ai space the vector pk was drawn. Then the unit vector ek is the B-representation of the vector ljk; if we add any positive multiple of ek to column Qik of an Ai, a-admissible matrix Q', the resulting matrix will still be Ai, B-admissible (this is because the new matrix will continue to be symmetric and positive definite on Ai, since the only change is an increase in a diagonal entry; thus the rank will still be equal to the dimension of Ai; and therefore, since the new column space will clearly be a subspace of Ai, it will in fact be equal to Ai). We have shown, in other words, that for every component k, one of the matrices Q' can have its diagonal entry Qfk increased arbitrarily without destroying its admissibility; this is clearly sufficient to yield (4.10).
Now we must rearrange the order of B to achieve (4.11). We will first rearrange theorderofthevectorsin~B1".Letr=m,,+m,,.ThenJ,-={r+1,r+2,.;.,r+m,.} -in other words, .Bi. consists of the vectors pk for which k = (+ 1, [ + 2, . . . , (+m,".
The rearrangement will be performed in a series of ml. steps, as follows. At step 1 we will exchange one of the members of 48, n with fir + 1 , which results in a new order for Bin and results also in a corresponding exchange of rows and columns of the matrix Q. At step 2 we will exchange one of the remaining members of81.(i.e.oneofthePkfork=r+2,...,r+ml.)withPr+2,againgivingusanew order for 46i. and a rearrangement of the matrix Q. We continue for a total of ml" steps, at each step t exchanging ar + t with a later member of Bi. (under the order prevailing at that step), say pk, where < + t I kl r + ml", thereby causing a corresponding exchange of row and column r+ t of matrix Q with row and column k, and also rearranging the matrix Q accordingly. It remains only to specify which vector & (with kz(+ t) will be exchanged with /It at step t. (Note that we allow at each step for the possibility of exchanging a vector with itself -i.e. for the null rearrangement .)
At each step t of the rearranging process, suppose that for s= l+ t, . . . , r+ ml", each of the columns Q., of every admissible matrix Q has nothing but zero entries in the rows above row r+ t -i.e. Q,=O, when r and s satisfy both r< c+ t and r+ trslr+m,.. Then Theorem 3.2 ensures that, contrary to assumption, B is not well-ordered, because either the set ZVi" is not minimal or else the space 2,. is not equal to CiEul Ai. Thus, at least one of these columns of at least one matrix Q has a non-zero entry above row < + t ; let that column be the one that is exchanged with column < + t, and exchange the same pair of rows in Q, and exchange the corresponding pair of vectors in $8. Clearly, in the new matrix Q, the column <+ t has a non-zero entry above the diagonal entry Q+ l,r+ t. Because the set of (A,)?, Badmissible profiles is convex, there is in fact a matrix Q that has a non-zero entry above every diagonal entry in Br"r ", as (4.11) requires.
Finally, we rearrange the segment +%& of 3 in exactly the same way that we rearranged ,%?r ", and the proof is complete. 0
We are finally prepared to give a proof of Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let 99 be a well-ordered basis that satisfies both (4.10) and (4.11) in (A,)?. Admissibility of matrices will be defined throughout in terms of the basis B. Because Ai and A, are separable in (A,)?, Theorem 3.1 guarantees that for every (Ai)? -admissible profile (Q', . . . , Q") the matrix Q= Cy Q', which we will denote by Q(n), must have the form: for every admissible profile (Q', . . . , Q"+'). Then Theorem 3.2 will ensure that Ai and A2 are separable in (A,);". We have made use of the lemma's assumption that Ai and A2 are separable in (A,)I : it was that assumption that enabled us to write Q(n) in the form (4.12). We will make use of the assumption that A, cannot affect A, in (A,)~" by invoking it in order to apply Lemma 4.3. In order to apply Lemma 4.3 to Q(n + l), we rewrite the block-partitioned submatrix B of Q(n + l), as defined in (4.2), in terms of the finer partitioning we are using here (and we highlight the top and left borders of We must show that each of the blocks B,,,,,B,,Y,B1,,2,, and B1,12" consists only of zeroes, and that the same is true either of Bif3 and Bi,,s or of BzT3 and Bzs3; symmetry of Q(n + 1) will then ensure that it has either the form (4.13) or (4.14). Let Q., denote an arbitrary column in the left border of B (i.e. SE JZ,). Because the ranks of B and B are the same, the column Q., is a linear combination of the nonborder columns:
Q.scj,cJ, Il,Q.j+jz2 hjQ.j+jz3AjQ.j-
Moreover, since B is non-singular, this linear combination is unique. We will show that Aj = 0 for each j E Ji I, -i.e. that Q., is actually a (unique) linear combination of only the 2"-and 3-columns of B. We adopt the notational simplification J*= Ji.UJ2"UJs; thus, (4.16) becomes Q.s= CjeJi AjQ.j. We consider the 1"-columns (i.e. the indices j E Ji") one at a time, moving from left to right. Thus, let k be the first member of Ji.. Because B satisfies (4.1 l), there is a non-zero entry qrk where r < j. Moreover, the row r can be chosen so that re J2,. [It can certainly be so chosen in Q(n); if that entry becomes zero in Q(n + 1) -i.e. when Q"+' is added to Q(n) -then it can be made non-zero by replacing (Q' , . . . . Q") with [(Q', . . . . Q") for arbitrarily small c.] Within the row Q,. , let c denote the row vector consisting only of components qrj where je J* -i.e. components in the 1 "-, 2"-, and 3-columns; clearly, the first component of c is non-zero. Note that qrs= CjeJ* AjCj = C-2, according to (4.16). Because S? satisfies (4. lo), we can perturb the diagonal entries of Q without destroying its admissibility. Thus, according to Lemmas B.2 and B.3 of Appendix B, if Ak#O, then there is an admissible matrix Q' in which the row Q:. is the same as the corresponding row Q,. of Q, but for which the coefficients & that correspond to the ~j in (4.16) satisfy c. IZ'# c.A -i.e. qisfq,,
which cannot be true, because Q:. = Q,. . The contradiction establishes that Ak must be zero. Now we have established that each of the 2'-columns is a (unique) linear combination of the columns Q.j for j E J* \ (k}, so we can repeat the argument of the preceding paragraph, replacing J* with J* \ {k}, thereby establishing that the next coefficient, &+ 1 , is also zero. Continuing in the same way, we eventually show that there is an admissible Q in which 3Lj=O for every je J1. -i.e. each of the 2'-columns is a unique linear combination of just the 2"-and 3-columns. The same recursive argument also establishes that each of the 1 '-rows in (4.15) is a unique linear combination of just the 1 #-and 3-rows. [For each k E J2" the non-zero abovethe-diagonal entry could lie in the block Bzf2", which is not in the matrix B ; symmetry of Q(n + 1) guarantees, however, that it will also lie in Bzo2, -that is, there is a non-zero entry in B to the left of each diagonal entry in B2f12rf. This is why we can apply the argument here to the 1 '-rows, but not to the 1 '-columns.] We have established, then, that the rank of the following matrix is the same as the rank of B33:
We now establish that each of the blocks B,,,,, Btr2", Btn2,, and BIf12. consists only of zeroes. For each diagonal entry S;ii in B3, we can say only [because blocks B31,, B,,., B2,3, and B2"3 do not appear in (4.17)] that there will be (in the matrix of (4.17)) a non-zero entry above qjj in column j or a non-zero entry to the left of S;ij in row j. This turns out to be enough, however: each of the 2'-and 2"-columns in (4.17) must (by the same argument used above) be a linear combination only of those 3-columns that have no non-zeroes above the diagonal -and thus each of the blocks B, r2,, B1 r2", BIV2(, and BIfj2" consists only of zeroes. Finally, notice that the blocks Btj3, BrU3, B32,, and B32" in Q(n) consist only of zeroes; thus, all non-zero entries in these blocks that appear in Q(n + 1) are also nonzero in Q"+'. Suppose that at least one of the two blocks B,,, or Btf13 contains a non-zero, and that at least one of the two blocks B32, or B32" contains a non-zero. Then Lemma A.3 guarantees that there is also a non-zero entry in one of the blocks 4'3 9 h3, B32', or B32"? which we have just shown cannot be so. Thus, either B32, and B32" both consist only of zeroes, (4.18) or else Brj3 and B,., both consist only of zeroes. (4.19) This establishes that every admissible Q(n + 1) has either the form (4.13) or (4.14), but allows that some have one form and some the other [i.e. it allows that some matrices Q(n + 1) satisfy (4.18) but not (4.19), and that some others satisfy (4.19) but not (4.18)]. However, if there is a Q(n + 1) -and thus a Qn+' -that violates (4.18) and another that violates (4.19), then convexity of the set of admissible matrices guarantees that there is a Q(n + 1) that violates both (4.18) and (4.19), which we have just shown cannot happen. Thus, either every admissible Q(n + 1) has the form (4.13), or else every admissible Q(n + 1) has the form (4.14). 0
A potential application to externalities and decentralization
Hurwicz, in his celebrated 1960 paper that introduced the formal analysis of allocation mechanisms, identified a property of economic environments that he call-ed 'decomposability',3 the property by which he gave formal expression to the notion of an economic externality. Hurwicz's definition was later used by Ledyard (1971) to study the interplay between externalities, information, and Pareto optimality.
It is possible to model economic situations in such a way that Hurwicz's (1960) definition becomes a special case of the decomposability defined in the present paper (see Hurwicz, 1960 , Sections 2 and 5). It therefore seems natural to continue interpreting indecomposabilities as externalities. Indeed, our interest in externalities arises from the belief that they are a primary cause of market failure, and Hurwicz and Walker (1988) obtain just such a 'failure' result, in spades: when externalities (indecomposabilities) are present, no decentralized mechanism will yield satisfactory outcomes via non-strategic behavior on the part of the mechanism's participants. There is one respect in which this result -that externalities pose serious problems for decentralized economic decision-making -is at odds with the conventional wisdom: Hurwicz and Walker (1988) show that the classical pure exchange ('Edgeworth box') problem is naturally representable as an indecomposable indifference structure (in other words, an externality is present in the pure exchange problem); but the conventional view is that the pure exchange problem is the benchmark case representing complete absence of externalities. I believe this clash with the conventional view, however, is a strength of the new notion of decomposability, not a weakness. It is only when the economy is 'atomistic' (there are so many agents that each is negligible) that decentralized markets are supposed to be fully successful. Perhaps, as the Hurwicz and Walker (1988) results indicate, when individuals are not negligible the benchmark case of pure exchange is (at least qualitatively) no more amenable to decentralization than those economic situations in which externalities of a more traditional kind are present. (See Groves and Ledyard, 1988 , especially Section V, for a discussion of this.) The new notion of decomposability presented in the present paper may provide a framework in which it is possible to isolate the special nature of the 'pure exchange externality' that causes it to lose its force when there are many individuals, while other kinds of externalities do not vanish -and perhaps even grow worse -when they involve many individuals.
3) a basis for A. Let Q = C'SC, where C is the matrix whose rows are the members of 8 (expressed in terms of &), and let M=def HC, so that the rows of A4 form a basis (with respect to E) for A. Then Since M= HP, each row of His the &X7-expression of the corresponding row of M; in particular, then, each row of H is the 33-expression of a member of A. Since the rows of H are also linearly independent (because P-' is non-singular), they form a basis for A. Thus, at a1 = 0 we have:
